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ABSTRACT
This article sheds comparative and contextual light on European and international human
rights debates around the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. It
does so through an examination of adverse inferences from criminal suspect’s silence in
three European jurisdictions with differing procedural traditions: Ireland, Italy and the
Netherlands. The article highlights the manner in which adverse inferences have come
to be drawn at trial in the three jurisdictions, despite the existence of both European and
domestic legal protections for the right to silence. It also explores differing approaches
to the practical operation of inference-drawing procedures, including threshold require-
ments, varying evidential uses of silence and procedural safeguards. The authors argue
that human rights’ standard-setting institutions ought to provide clarity on the conditions
under which adverse inferences may be tolerated, including the purpose(s) for which
inferences may be used, and the necessary surrounding safeguards.
KEY WORDS: right to silence, privilege against self-incrimination, adverse inferences,
procedural rights, Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights, EU Directive on the
Presumption of Innocence
1. INTRODUCTION
The privilege against self-incrimination and the related right to remain silent are recog-
nised across many jurisdictions, international conventions and the jurisprudence of
both national and international courts as important guarantees of fair criminal proceed-
ings. Although the right to silence is firmly embedded in the criminal procedural laws of
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European states, its scope and rationales are often debated. A prominent point of con-
troversy around the right to remain silent is whether and to what extent reliance on this
right can result in negative consequences for the suspect1 within criminal proceedings,
namely whether and under which conditions ‘adverse inferences’ may be drawn from
the suspect’s silence. We understand ‘adverse inferences’ as conclusions, negative for
the suspect, drawn from their silence or failure to provide certain information in the
course of criminal proceedings, which can impact upon the determination of criminal
responsibility or the assessment of evidence.2
The question of whether and under which conditions criminal courts should be
authorised to draw adverse inferences from the suspect’s silence remains far from settled
in European human rights law. This became evident in particular during the negotia-
tions of the EU Directive on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption
of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (‘EU
Directive on the Presumption of Innocence’),3 which contains provisions on the right
to remain silent.4 Mirroring the debates in European (human rights) law, the question
of whether and to what extent adverse inferences from silence may be tolerated as a legit-
imate limitation on the right to remain silent sparks controversy in many national legal
systems in Europe and beyond. Some common law legal systems, including England and
Wales, Singapore and parts of Australia, expressly allow inferences to be drawn subject
to safeguards or limitations,5 while other legal systems (common law, civil law and
mixed) such as the United States, Germany and Scotland expressly prohibit the drawing
of adverse inferences from a suspect’s silence, although often subject to exceptions.6
In this article, we argue that the question to be posed by European human rights’
standard-setting institutions is not whether adverse inferences from the suspect’s
silence in criminal proceedings should or should not be authorised. Rather, further
development of the doctrine of adverse inferences lies in the refinement of the
conditions under which such inferences may be tolerated, including the purpose(s) for
which inferences may be used, and the surrounding safeguards. We base our argument
on a detailed contextual analysis of the regime of drawing adverse inferences from
1 For consistency, we use the term ‘suspect’ throughout this article to refer to all persons suspected or accused
of a criminal offence, who are subject to a criminal investigation or (called to) defend against an accusation
in a criminal trial. ‘Suspect’ is used also where national law refers to ‘defendant’ or ‘accused’ at the specific
stages of the proceedings.
2 We are not considering within this article any issue around failure to submit to provide bodily samples, but
rather a failure to respond to police questions or provide information to the court of trial. It is also beyond
the scope of this article to consider any impact that silence might have on charging decisions, applications
for pre-trial release, or sentencing decisions post-conviction.
3 Directive (EU) 2016/313 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 March 2016 on the
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to present at the trial
in criminal proceedings, OJ L 65, 11.3.2016 at 1–11.
4 See below at Section 2.
5 Daly, ‘The Right to Silence: Inferences and interference’ (2014) 47 Australian & New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 59; Khee-Jin Tan, ‘Adverse Inferences and the Right to Silence: Re-examining the Singapore
Experience’ (1997) Criminal Law Review 478.
6 Maclin, ‘The Right to Silence v. the Fifth Amendment’ (2016) University of Chicago Legal Forum 7; Glover,
‘Proceed with Caution (s): A Critique of the Carloway Review’s Rejection of Statutory Adverse Inference
Provisions in Scottish Criminal Law’ (2013) 4 Aberdeen Student Law Review 1; Bohlander, Principles of
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a suspect’s silence in three EU legal systems: Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy.7 The
chosen jurisdictions represent different legal procedural traditions: Ireland is a common
law jurisdiction with an accusatorial criminal process; the Netherlands has a civil law
system with an inquisitorial criminal process and Italy operates a civil law system with
a hybrid—mainly accusatorial—criminal process.8
We begin by narrating the debate around adverse inferences from the suspect’s
silence from the historical and human rights’ perspectives, with particular focus on
European developments. Next, we examine the general provisions on the right to silence
and adverse inferences from silence as they are interpreted and applied in legal practice
within the three specified jurisdictions. We then discuss the use of adverse inferences
and any attendant safeguards, and the evidential purpose to which they are put, focusing
in particular on their actual practical purposes (as opposed to their characterisation in
domestic law). In the concluding section, we reflect on the further development of the
doctrine of adverse inferences from the suspect’s silence in European and national legal
systems.
2. THE DEBATE AROUND ADVERSE INFERENCES AND THE NEED FOR A
CONTEXTUAL APPROACH
The issue of drawing adverse inferences from the suspect’s silence in criminal proceed-
ings creates obvious tensions from a human rights perspective. It is argued, on one hand,
that allowing courts to draw negative inferences from silence penalises the use of the
right and amounts to compulsion to speak.9 This is said to deprive the right to remain
silent of any meaning.10 The opposite view is that inferences exert only a minimal
or no pressure on suspects to speak.11 Suspects must accept that remaining silent
carries a higher risk of not being believed. This is derived from the ‘common-sense’
argument against the right to silence attributed to Bentham: ‘Innocence claims the right
of speaking, and guilt invokes the privilege to silence’.12 In this sense, the restrictions
placed by inferences on the right to silence are (only) indirect and not comparable to
7 These systems are central to a wider research project on the right to silence, funded by the European
Commission, carried out by the authors and colleagues at Maastricht University, Antwerp University,
Dublin City University and KU Leuven—‘EmpRiSe: Right to Silence and Related Rights in Pre-Trial
Suspects Interrogations in the EU: Legal and Empirical Study and Promoting Best Practice’.
8 Although Italy traditionally belongs to the group of civil law systems, having imported the French codes,
it has moved to an adversarial system of criminal procedure with the 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure
(Codice di Procedura Penale, Decree of the President of the Republic No 447, 22 September 1988).
9 See Griffin v California, 380 US 609 (1965); John Murray v United Kingdom Application No 18731/91,
Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8 February 1996 at paras 41–42.
10 Maloney, ‘The Criminal Evidence (N.I) Order 1988: A Radical Departure from the Common Law Right to
Silence in the U.K.?’ (1993) 16 British Columbia International and Comparative Law Review 425; O’Reilly,
‘England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves towards an Inquisitorial System of Justice’ (1994) 85 Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology 402; Patanè, ‘Il Diritto al Silenzio dell’Imputato’ (2006) at 214, 217–8.
11 Ingraham, ‘The Right of Silence, the Presumption of Innocence, the Burden of Proof, and a Modest
Proposal: A Reply to O’Reilly’ (1996) 86 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology at 559; Bellin,
‘Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment Prohibition of Adverse Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial
Silence’ (2010) 71 Ohio State Law Journal 229.
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other acts that directly violate the right to silence—for instance, compelling suspects to
testify under the threat of immediate sanction.13
The inherent tension of adverse inferences with the rights of the suspect sparks con-
siderable controversy around the issue in European and domestic law. To comparative
lawyers, the concept of adverse inferences from the suspect’s silence is mostly known
from the law of England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, ‘popularised’ in a string of
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments on the topic, beginning with
the case of Murray v the United Kingdom. In Murray, the ECtHR was called to examine
whether the regime of drawing adverse inferences from the suspect’s silence under
the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 was compatible with Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR ruled that it would be
incompatible with the right to silence if a conviction was based solely or mainly on
the suspect’s failure to answer police questions. However, it accepted that inferences
can be drawn ‘in situations which clearly call for an explanation’ and they may be used
to consider the persuasiveness of the prosecution evidence, provided that a number of
safeguards are met. These were, namely: whether or not the suspect was informed about
the consequences of remaining silent; whether they understood the caution; whether or
not the suspect had access to legal advice and whether the inference was drawn fairly and
reasonably by the court. Thus, under ECtHR case law, negative evidentiary inferences
from silence are tolerated, as long as they are accompanied by safeguards,14 and only
relied upon where a prima facie case has already been established independently of
the inferences.15 Despite criticism,16 the Court has been consistent in applying this
approach.
Although the issue seemed to have been settled in the ECtHR case law, the debate
on adverse inferences from silence was recently re-opened during the negotiations of
the right to silence provisions of the EU Directive on the Presumption of Innocence.
The Directive represents one of a series of EU legislative instruments aimed at the
harmonisation of domestic criminal procedural laws of member states in order to
facilitate judicial cooperation in criminal matters.17 The European Commission and the
European Parliament argued that the right to silence in criminal proceedings should
be recognised as absolute and that drawing any sort of adverse inferences from sus-
pects’ silence should be prohibited by the Directive. The European Council and some
13 See the reasoning of the ECtHR in John Murray supra n 9 at para 49: ‘The facts of the present case
accordingly fall to be distinguished from those in Funke . . . where criminal proceedings were brought
against the applicant by the customs authorities in an attempt to compel him to provide evidence of
offences he had allegedly committed. Such a degree of compulsion in that case was found by the Court
to be incompatible with Article 6 since, in effect, it destroyed the very essence of the privilege against self-
incrimination’, citing Funke v France Application No 10828/84, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 25 February
1993.
14 John Murray supra n 9; Condron v United Kingdom Application No 35718/97, Merits and Just Satisfaction,
2 May 2000.
15 Telfner v Austria Application No 33501/96, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 20 March 2011.
16 See e.g. partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti in John Murray supra n 9; Michael and Emmerson, ‘Current
Topic: The Right to Silence’ (1995) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 4.
17 Article 82(2) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/01; Council of the
European Union ‘Resolution of the Council on a Roadmap for strengthening procedural rights of suspected
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Member States, however, argued for a less ‘radical’ approach in line with the ECtHR
case law.18
The resulting text of the Directive reflected a compromise, which can, confusingly,
be interpreted in both ways, namely as banning the drawing of adverse inferences from
silence, or as authorising them under certain conditions. Thus, Article 7(5) states that
‘the exercise by suspects and accused persons of the right to remain silent or of the right
not to incriminate oneself shall not be used against them and shall not be considered
to be evidence that they have committed the criminal offence concerned’. Recital 28,
however, contains a caveat to this (seemingly) absolute prohibition, stating that while
the silence of the suspect/accused person cannot in itself be considered incriminating
evidence, ‘this should be without prejudice to national rules concerning the assessment
of evidence by courts or judges, provided that the rights of the defence are respected’.
The Recital seems to refer to systems, which operate the principle of free proof (see
below), and it would, as argued by two Dutch authors, authorise relying on adverse
inferences for purposes other than serving as direct evidence of guilt.19
While legislation introducing adverse inferences to the criminal process was first
enacted in Singapore in 1976,20 in Ireland in 198421 and in Northern Ireland in 1988,22
the most well-known inference provisions are those introduced in England and Wales
under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA).23 Interestingly, Quirk
suggests that, given its foundational heritage in terms of the common law, what happens
within the legal system of England and Wales is of ‘disproportionate global significance’.
She observes that the ‘right of silence was exported from [that jurisdiction] to most
of the common law world and the position taken by England and Wales on the right
of silence has caused “tremors” across the common law world’.24 The level of critical
attention given to the inference-drawing provisions of England and Wales, not least
within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, has heightened the awareness of interference
with the right to silence as an issue in common law countries.
Historically, the doctrine of adverse inferences was unknown in civil law systems.
However, this does not signify that courts in these jurisdictions were prohibited,
in practice, from drawing inferences from a party’s failure to provide information
18 Cras and Erbežnik, ‘The Directive on the Presumption of Innocence and the Right to be Present at Trial’
(2016) 1 Eucrim 25 at 31–2.
19 Meijer and ter Haar, ‘Zwijgrecht en Procesopstelling: het Toenemende Belang van het Uitblijven van een
Aannemelijke Verklaring op de Bewijsbeslissing’ (2018) 23 Tijdschrift Praktijkwijzer Strafrecht at 62. In a
recent case, the Dutch Supreme Court concluded that the use of inferences from silence to ‘corroborate’
other evidence is not incompatible with the Directive: Supreme Court 29 January 2019, NJ 2019/310 met
annotatie van N. Rozemond.
20 Criminal Procedure Code (Spore) sections 122(6) and 123(1), as inserted by the Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act 1976 (Spore).
21 Criminal Justice Act 1984, sections 18 and 19.
22 Criminal Evidence (NI) Order 1988, sections 5 and 6.
23 The Singapore provisions permitting inferences from silence, and those in Northern Ireland and Irish
legislation took inspiration from the recommendations of the 11th report of Criminal Law Revision
Committee in 1972. England and Wales had to wait 22 years before these recommendations were enacted
in the CJPOA.
24 Quirk, ‘The Case for Restoring the Right to Silence’ in Child and Duff (eds) Criminal Law Reform Now:
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or evidence.25 Rules for assessing the probative value of evidence are scarce within
civil law systems,26 where the traditional approach is based on the principle of free
proof.27 The standard of proof in such systems is that of ‘intime conviction’ (or ‘intimate
certainty’), where judges are expected to form an intimate (personal) conviction
concerning the case before them, based on their own assessment of the evidence in its
entirety.28 Such evidence is generally presented by way of written dossier, as compared
with the oral tradition of witness evidence before lay juries in common law systems.
Traditionally, civil law judges were not expected to explain how each piece of evidence
served to meet parties’ legal and evidentiary burdens. As a result, they were relatively
free to take into account a party’s failure to provide an explanation when forming their
judgment and were not obliged to mention that certain inferences had been drawn.29
With the introduction of adverse inference provisions to the criminal procedural
laws of many common law countries, it might well be thought that the right to silence
is better protected in civil law jurisdictions. However, as demonstrated further in this
article, adverse consequences can flow from silence in both types of system.
A thorough contextual examination of the law and practice around adverse infer-
ences from silence is necessary to advance the debate around their use in criminal pro-
ceedings. A comparative approach, representing major European procedural traditions,
is warranted to inform the discussion on the right to silence and adverse inferences
on the European level. Consequently, the following sections present a comparative
analysis of the domestic provisions on the right to silence and adverse inferences from
silence in Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands, as they operate in the legal practice of these
jurisdictions, situated within their respective institutional and procedural contexts.
3. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SILENCE IN THE THREE
JURISDICTIONS
In each of the three jurisdictions under examination in this article, the right to silence
has been legally recognised within important, foundational sources of law. In Ireland,
for example, the right to silence is a recognised constitutional right, though there has
been some confusion as to its exact constitutional locus. While it is generally viewed as a
corollary to the right to freedom of expression,30 it also draws protection both in the pre-
trial investigative period of police detention and at trial from the right to a fair trial.31 In
Italy, the right to silence was formally recognised in 1969, when the obligation to inform
suspects of this right was introduced in an amendment32 to the 1930 Code of Criminal
25 Van Kessel, ‘European Perspectives on the Accused as a Source of Testimonial Evidence’ (1998) 100 West
Virginia Law Review 800 at 821–3; Damaska, ‘Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study’ (1973) 121 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 506 at 527.
26 Damaska, ibid.
27 Bard, Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Article Six of the European Human Rights Convention in a Comparative
Perspective (2008) at 301–2.
28 Sorvatzioti and Manson, ‘Burden of Proof and L’intime Conviction: Is the Continental Criminal Trial
Moving to the Common Law?’ (2018) 23 (1) Canadian Criminal Law Review 107.
29 Bard, supra n 27.
30 Article 40.6 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, the Irish Constitution of 1937.
31 Article 38.1.
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Law.33 Additional indirect protection for the right to silence was later found within the
1947 Italian Constitution, which safeguards the right to defence as ‘inviolable’ in every
phase and instance of criminal proceedings.34 The right to defence is unanimously
recognised as underpinning the right to silence.35 In the Netherlands, the 1926 Code
of Criminal Procedure (‘CCP’)36 —which is still in force—provided for the right to
remain silent, against strong opposition claiming that such a right would interfere with
truth-finding.
The rules which govern police interrogations add some detail to the practicality
of the operation of the right to silence across all three jurisdictions. For example, the
law in each state requires relevant interrogating authorities to caution a suspect, before
the start of any interview or questioning, in relation to their right not to answer any
question.37 In each of the jurisdictions, the right to silence protects both full and partial
silence—suspects can refuse to answer all questions posed by a public authority in the
context of criminal proceedings or only some of them. A recent Irish case, for example,
confirmed the practical reality that many suspects detained for questioning by the police
can and do waver between answering some questions and not others, and no particular
form of words is required to properly assert the right.38 However, once a suspect makes
a statement or inculpatory remark (implicitly or explicitly waiving their right to silence),
this may form part of the evidence presented at trial.39
In Ireland, outside of the specific operation of certain statutory inference provisions
(set out below), if a suspect maintains silence throughout police interrogation, the jury
at trial will be told nothing about the interrogation.40 If certain questions were answered
and silence maintained otherwise, the jury will only be told of the answers, not the
silence.41
In Italy, any exercise of the right to silence by the suspect during pre-trial questioning
must be recorded within the minutes.42 However, trial judges do not generally have
access to those minutes. The duty is to record the exercise of the right stems from the
need to document all the circumstances of the questioning and it is not intended as
facilitating any reliance at trial on the pre-trial silence of the suspect.43 The admission
of a suspect’s pre-trial statement at trial (by request of a party) and the use that the
33 Codice di Procedura Penale, Royal Decree No 1399 of 19 October 1930, Article 78. See further Grevi, Nemo
Tenetur se Detergere: Interrogatorio dell’Imputato e Diritto al Silenzio nel Processo Penale italiano (1972) at 3.
34 Article 24(2).
35 In the case law, see, inter alia, Constitutional Court, Decision No 34, 4 April 1973; in the scholarship, see
e.g. Mazza, L’interrogatorio e l’Esame dell’Imputato nel suo Procedimento (2004) at 46; Moscarini, ‘Silenzio
dell’Imputato (Diritto al)’ in Enciclopedia del diritto. Annali (2010) at 1081.
36 Article 29.
37 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 1988 (‘CCP’), Article 64(3)(b); Article 29 CCP in the Netherlands; in
Ireland this is set out in the Judges’ Rules 1918, as laid down in People (Attorney General) v Cummins [1972]
IR 31.
38 DPP v M [2018] IESC 21, [2018] 1 IR 810.
39 See, for example, the Dutch Supreme Court case of 9 December 1986, NJ 1987/541. This is governed in
Ireland by the common law rules relating to confession evidence.
40 DPP v Finnerty [1999] 4 IR 364.
41 People (DPP) v Brazil [2002] 3 JIC 2211 (Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 22nd March, 2002); DPP
v M supra n 38; DPP v SM [2020] IECA 170, 24 June 2020.
42 CPP, Article 65(3).
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trial judge can make of that statement will depend on a number of factors, including,
amongst others, the circumstances of the pre-trial questioning, the suspect’s presence
or absence at trial, and their willingness to be questioned at trial. In some cases,
the statement can be used as evidence against the suspect, in others only to challenge
the credibility of the suspect.44
In the Netherlands, the distinction between the pre-trial and trial phases is not
as clearly drawn, and judges at trial have unrestricted access to the entire dossier of
evidence. Accordingly, they are aware of what questions were asked and answered,
or not, during the police interrogation. The Dutch courts consider the totality of the
evidence across the entire proceedings. Like many civil law jurisdictions, the Dutch
criminal process was based on the principle of free evaluation of evidence (still codified
in CCP),45 although in reality it has been largely undermined by case law establishing
limits on the judge’s freedom to freely assess evidence.46
In Italy, there are no legislative provisions prohibiting (or allowing) the judicial
drawing of a negative inference from a suspect’s exercise of the right to silence at the
trial stage.47 The Code simply provides that if the suspect refuses to answer a question,
this must be recorded within the minutes.48 While certain scholars have argued that it
would be impermissible to draw negative inferences,49 the majority of the scholarship
believes that the trial judge can attach probative value to silence at the trial stage, once
the suspect has agreed to be questioned.50 In Ireland, the suspect is fully entitled to
refuse to give evidence at their own trial. While a trial judge may point out to a jury
that the suspect failed to give evidence in court, it must be made clear that there is no
obligation to do so and the judge must specifically inform the jury that they ought to
draw no adverse inferences from the exercise of the right to silence in such a manner at
trial.51
As we shall now see, however, while each of the three jurisdictions subscribes to
the notion of defence rights, the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
incrimination and the right to remain silent, each has introduced, in one manner or
another, procedural and evidential consequences for suspects who do rely upon the
latter right.
4. ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM SILENCE
A close examination of the Irish, Dutch and Italian criminal justice systems reveals the
different ways in which adverse inferences from silence can become a feature of criminal
procedure: by statutory development or through case law; framed as permission to
44 Articles 503 and 513 CCP.
45 Article 338.
46 Dreissen, Bewijsmotivering in Strafzaken (dissertation Maastricht) (2007) at 358.
47 Bonzano, L’interrogatorio Investigativo (2012) at 160.
48 CPP, Article 206(2).
49 See among others Sottani, ‘Silenzio (Diritto al)’, in Gaito et al. (eds) Digesto delle Discipline Penalistiche,
(2013) at 8.
50 E.g. Cordero, Procedura Penale (2006) at 254; Grevi supra n 33 at 356–7; Bonzano supra n 47 at 170–1 and
Moscarini supra n 35 at 1096. This view is, however, not unanimously shared. See Moscarini at 1096–7 for
a summary of the debate.
51 See DPP v Finnerty [1999] 4 IR 364; DPP v Coddington unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 31 May
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draw inferences with safeguards and limitations, or as a prohibition from doing so with
exceptions.
As noted earlier, the right to silence was protected under the common law and
exported to the colonies of the British empire. Ireland was one such colony, and it
traditionally subscribed to the notion of protecting the right to silence as part of the
common law. However, while less well-known than the English interferences with the
right to silence under CJPOA, Irish efforts to interfere substantially with that right
significantly predate that legislation.
As far back as 1931, an amendment to the Constitution of the Irish Free State pro-
vided that it was a criminal offence for an arrested person to refuse to answer particular
questions put to them by police officers acting under certain powers.52 However, when
a new Constitution was enacted in 1937, this provision was not carried over and the
right to silence regained its traditional common law protection. Just 2 years later, with
rising tensions in Northern Ireland and concerns around threats to the legitimacy of
the state, a new legislative provision made it an offence, punishable by up to 6 months’
imprisonment, for a suspect detained under certain circumstances to fail to account for
their movements and actions during a specified period.53 This was challenged before
the ECtHR in the 1996 case of Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland, where the Court found
a breach of the Article 6 right to a fair trial, as the impugned provision ‘destroyed the very
essence of [the suspects’] privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain
silent’.54
Since then, there has been a discernible shift away from offences based on failure
to provide information, and, instead, the Irish parliament (the Oireachtas) has created
a slew of statutory inference-drawing provisions. These are more acceptable to the
ECtHR55 and their constitutionality has been upheld by the domestic courts. The
location of the right to silence primarily within the constitutional protection of the
right to freedom of expression has led to the domestic judicial acceptance of legislative
restrictions thereon which are deemed necessary in order to serve the exigencies of
public order and morality.56 Having said that the judiciary maintains a high level of
respect for the right to silence in general terms and has insisted that any interference
therewith goes only as far as clearly required by the relevant statute.57
Briefly stated, the legislative provisions apply, with varying thresholds, caveats and
safeguards, in the following circumstances. In relation to all serious offences, an infer-
ence may be drawn at trial from a pre-trial failure to account for objects, substances
or marks on the suspect,58 or from the suspect’s presence in a particular place,59 or,
more broadly, from a failure to mention any fact in the pre-trial process which is relied
upon in defence at trial.60 In the specific contexts of a charge of membership of an
52 Article 2A as inserted by the Constitution (Amendment No 17) Act 1931.
53 Section 52 of the Offences Against the State Act 1939.
54 Application No 34720/97, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 December 2000 at para 55.
55 See for example John Murray supra n 9.
56 See Rock v Ireland [1998] 2 ILRM 35.
57 See, for example DPP v Wilson [2017] IESC 53.
58 Criminal Justice Act 1984, section 18, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2007.
59 Criminal Justice Act 1984, section 19, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2007.
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unlawful organisation (most often the Irish Republican Army—IRA)61 or a charge of
participating in or contributing to any activity of a ‘criminal organisation’,62 an inference
may be drawn at trial from the pre-trial failure of a suspect to ‘answer a question material
to the investigation of the offence’.
In the two other jurisdictions, there are no statutory provisions specifying the
circumstances in which inferences might be drawn at trial from any failure on the part of
the suspect to answer certain questions or provide certain information. The emergence
of inference drawing in those jurisdictions has been more bottom-up than top-down,
emerging through the case law of the courts.
In the Netherlands, the right to silence contained in the CCP has previously been
described as absolute.63 However, since the late 1990s, the ‘absolute’ nature of the right
has been eroded by the case law of the Supreme Court, which has allowed for a suspect’s
silence (including at police interviews) to be taken into account when assessing the
evidence against them. In a well-known dictum, the Dutch Supreme Court stated
that a suspect’s refusal to make a statement or to answer certain questions cannot in
itself be considered ‘evidence’ of guilt.64 For instance, it would be improper to cite as
directly incriminating evidence parts of police interrogation records, where the suspect
expressly invokes the right to silence.65 At the same time, the Dutch Supreme Court
held that judges may draw (negative) conclusions from a refusal to answer certain
questions, partial explanations or similar behaviours, which may be interpreted as a
deliberate attempt to mislead the court or to provide a false statement.66 Besides, courts
may take the suspect’s silence into account when the latter does not give a ‘reasonable’
explanation with regard to the circumstances which, taken separately or in conjunction
with other evidence, are incriminating for them.67
The 1997 Strippenkaart judgment of the Dutch Supreme Court was the first case
to mention the possibility of drawing adverse inferences from suspect’s silence. In this
case, the Court held that it was lawful for the lower court to mention in its reasoning
that the suspect failed to provide any explanation as to why he had a bus ticket in
his pocket, validated close to the time and the location where the alleged offence had
been committed.68 An inference from this failure to account was said to strengthen
the prosecution case, although it was already strong enough to allow conviction. The
suspect was identified by several eyewitnesses, which, in conjunction with the bus ticket
61 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1998, section 2.
62 Criminal Justice Act 2006, section 72A, as inserted by Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, section 9:
A criminal organisation is defined by section 70 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006, as amended by section 3
of the Criminal Justice (Amendment) Act 2009, as ‘a structured group, however organised, that has as its
main purpose or activity the commission or facilitation of a serious offence’.
63 See, e.g. an influential Dutch commentary: Corstens, Het Nederlands Strafprocesrecht (2018), 9th edn.
64 Supreme Court, 24 July 1972, DD 72.176. The same facts and rulings were dealt with by the Supreme Court
in: Supreme Court, 27 June 1972, NJ 1972, 492. See also: Supreme Court, 12 March 1996, NJ 1996, 539,
Supreme Court, 10 November 1998, NJ 1999, 139 and Supreme Court, 1 June 2004, NJ 2004, 366. See
also: Reijntjes, Strafrechtelijk Bewijs in Wet en Praktijk (1980) at 167–70, 200–1; Knoops, Het Decryptiebevel
en het Nemo-Teneturbeginsel’ (2012) at 56–60, 78–82; Bemelmans, Totdat het Tegendeel is Bewezen (2018)
at 384–7.
65 Supreme Court, 5 June 2004, NJ 2004, 464.
66 Supreme Court, 12 November 1974, NJ 1975, 41.
67 Supreme Court, 3 June 1997, NJ 1997, 584.











trecht user on 06 M
ay 2021
Human Rights Protections in Drawing Inferences from Criminal Suspects’ Silence • 11
found on him, rendered the case against him provable ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ even
without taking into account his silence.
In Italy, as in the Netherlands, the courts have been the site of the introduction of
inferences drawn from a suspect’s silence. The majority of Italian scholarship on the
right to silence has stressed that any form of negative assessment or inference following
the exercise of the right should be impermissible since it is viewed as an expression of
the inviolable right to defence, safeguarded by the Constitution.69 This view has been
adopted also by a minority line of cases.70 However, the majority of the case law has
taken a less emphatic approach.
The most authoritative section of the Court of Cassation—the so-called Sezioni
Unite—has held that trial judges can draw inferences from the general behaviour of
the suspect during the proceedings.71 However, in so doing, they cannot reverse the
burden of proof (which lies on the prosecutor) and cannot substantially undermine
the exercise of the right to defence.72 Another section of the Court has more recently
underlined that a suspect’s behaviour during the proceedings must be assessed in
conjunction with other evidence or relevant elements.73 Although this particular line
of cases did not refer to silence specifically, more generally across the case law, silence
is considered to constitute relevant behaviour.74 Accordingly, trial judges can draw
negative consequences from the silence of the suspect, with certain limitations.
The principle of free interpretation of evidence is a recurring theme in the Italian
case law concerning the right to silence.75 Inferences from silence are justified by the
need to avoid limiting the ‘intime conviction’ of the judge, which should allow the judge
to assess the behaviour of suspects throughout the proceedings and, in particular, their
silence in the face of evidence against them.76 However, some scholars have found this
reference unpersuasive because the principle cannot undermine the right to silence.77
To put too much emphasis on the principle of free interpretation of evidence carries the
risk of giving judges carte blanche on the drawing of negative inferences from silence
that would undermine (or breach) the right itself and other related rights, such as the
right to defence and the presumption of innocence. Considering the possible evidential
significance to be attached to silence, the case law has been firm in drawing a distinction
between the use of silence as evidence to prove the guilt of the suspect and other
evidential uses. The first is impermissible: the silence of the suspect during pre-trial
questioning (or the refusal to be questioned at trial) can never be used as an element
69 Patanè supra n 10 at 214, 217–8; Conso, Grevi and Bargis, Compendio di Procedura Penale (2014) at 110;
Moscarini supra no 35 at 1093, who also refers to a substantial literature; Cordero supra n 50 at 254.
70 Cass., Sez. III, 19 January 2010, n. 9239, in CED Cass., n. 246,233; Cass., Sez. V, 22 December 1998, Sica,
in CED Cass., n. 212,618.
71 Court of Cassation, sez. un., 21 October 1992, n. 1653, Marino ed altri.
72 ibid.
73 Court of Cassation, Section II, Decision No 16563 of 1 March 2017, in CED Cass., 269507, Cazanave e
altri.
74 Court of Cassation, Section II, Decision No 6348 of 28 February 2015, Drago; Sez. 2∧ , n. 22651 del 21
April 2010, Di Perna.
75 Most recently, see Corte di Cassazione, Section No VI, Decision No 28008 of 19 June 2019.
76 E.g. Court of Cassation, Section VI, 9 February 1996, Federici ed altro; Court of Cassation, Section III, 1
March 1982, Di Bitetto, n. 5863
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of guilt against the suspect, as this would breach the rules on the burden of proof.78
However, the case law has opened to the recognition of other evidential meanings
(discussed below).
5. THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
Varying threshold requirements for the drawing of inferences seem to have been estab-
lished across the three jurisdictions. The Dutch courts, for example, have followed the
ECtHR insistence that a prima facie case should exist against the suspect before an
inference from their exercise of the right to silence can be drawn.79 An illustrative case
from 2012 involved a suspicion of arson (setting fire to a shop), where there was no
direct evidence placing the suspect, the shop owner’s son, at the crime scene.80 There
were, however, several pieces of circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the
suspect’s hair was burnt, while the camera recordings of the perpetrator (which were not
clear enough to identify him) showed that his head had caught fire; a witness stated that
the perpetrator’s hair resembled that of the suspect and the shop door had been opened
with a remote control, suggesting the involvement of someone from the victim’s family.
The suspect remained silent throughout the proceedings. The district court drew an
inference from the suspect’s silence and convicted him. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, it was held that the prima facie standard does not presuppose that the burden
of proof should be fully met before allowing an inference to be taken into account. The
fact that there were ‘several pieces of incriminating evidence’ against the suspect and that
he failed to account for circumstances that clearly called for an explanation was deemed
sufficient to validly draw an inference from silence.
In another case, the Court of Appeal held that an inference from the suspect’s silence
could not be drawn on the basis of circumstances which were ‘remarkable’ but did not
clearly tie him to the commission of the offence. In such a case, the suspect could invoke
his right to remain silent in full and the court could not draw anything of evidential value
from his failure to make a statement.81
More recently, the Dutch Supreme Court has suggested that the evidentiary thresh-
old for allowing inferences from a suspect’s silence is lower than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.82 The Court defined this standard, citing relevant ECtHR case
law,83 as a prima facie case, which it interpreted as ‘a circumstance, which by itself
or in combination with other evidence calls for the conclusion that the suspect has
committed the offence’.84 Where the suspect fails to provide a reasonable explanation
to raise doubt about this conclusion, the burden of proof is met. In other words, the
78 Court of Cassation, Section III, Decision No 43254 of 19 September 2019, C. (Unfortunately, this decision
has not yet been made public, so further details are not given); Court of Cassation, Section VI, Decision No
8958 of 27 January 2015, Scarpa; Cass. Sez. 3∧, n. 9239 del 19 January 2010, B; Court of Cassation, Section
VI, 9 February 1996, Federici; Court of Cassation, Section II, Decision No 6348 of 28 February 2015, Drago.
79 Telfner, supra n 15.
80 Supreme Court, 5 June 2012, ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BW7372.
81 Appellate Court of Amsterdam, case of 12 January 2011, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2011:BP1003.
82 Supreme Court 5 July 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1381. In this case, involving a suspicion of burglary, the
suspect’s blood was found on the backdoor of the relevant house.
83 E.g. John Murray, supra n 9; Krumpoltz v Austria Application No 13201/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 18
March 2010; Telfner, supra n 15. See Meijer and ter Haar supra no 19.
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evidence must be such that, in combination with the suspect’s failure to provide an
explanation, the only reasonable or common sense conclusion is that the suspect is
guilty. This suggests that an inference can be the ‘tipping point’ which tilts the scales
from a position below the burden to proof, to reaching the burden of proof in the
particular case.
The Irish legislative inference provisions have differing in-built threshold require-
ments. While each insists that a suspect should not be solely or mainly convicted
on the basis of an inference from silence, along with other safeguards, the specific
circumstances in which an inference might be drawn differs across the provisions. Some
require only that, during pre-trial interrogation, when requested to do so, ‘the accused
failed or refused to give an account [of the specific matter covered by the provision],
being an account which in the circumstances at the time clearly called for an explanation
from him or her’.85 The meaning of ‘clearly called for’ has not been defined with any
clarity in Irish law. The broadest of the provisions, s 19A, has a double threshold,
whereby an inference may be drawn only if (i) a specific omitted fact is relied on in
defence at trial, and (ii) that fact ‘clearly called for’ explanation in the relevant pre-trial
circumstances. The provisions allowing for an inference to be drawn from a failure to
‘answer a question material to the investigation of the offence’, in the context of the
offence of membership of an unlawful organisation, or participating in or contributing
to any activity of a criminal organisation do not specify that an answer to the particular
question should be ‘clearly called for’ or that the failure to provide such an answer is
specifically relevant in the context of the subsequent trial. On a literal reading at least,
silence alone in the face of a question deemed to be ‘material to the investigation’ gives
rise to the inference. Of course, in order to be compliant with the jurisprudence of
the ECtHR, a prima facie case must be established in the evidence at trial before any
inference can properly be drawn.
The ECtHR jurisprudence (specifically, John Murray) has been recently referred to
also by the Italian Court of Cassation.86 However, the reference was meant to support its
decision to uphold a judgment which attached negative consequences to the suspect’s
silence throughout the proceedings and there was no specific reference to the threshold
requirement of the prima facie case. The Court of Cassation has, however, addressed
the appropriate threshold requirement in other cases. Most notably, it is argued that
silence can be taken into account only together with probative accusatory elements
with an unequivocal meaning (that admit a single explanation, that point in only one
direction).87 The threshold in Italy then seems to be higher that the prima facie case
required by the ECtHR.
85 Sections 18 and 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984 as substituted by sections 28 and 29 of the Criminal
Justice Act 2007. The sections require that the questioning garda should reasonably believe that the relevant
object, substance, mark or presence in a particular place may be attributable to the suspect’s participation
in the commission of a relevant offence, and the garda should inform the suspect of this belief.
86 Court of Cassation, Section VI, Decision No 28008 of 19 June 2019, Arena Giuseppe, in Ced. Cass., para 5;
Murray is also cited in Sez. 6, n. 40347 del 02/07/2018, Berlusconi.
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6. EVIDENTIAL PURPOSE: UNDERMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF A
DEFENCE
One of the evidential purposes, which inferences from silence serve, is to undermine
the credibility of defences or exculpatory information raised at trial. A court may infer
from the suspect’s pre-trial failure to mention a fact which is relevant to their defence
at trial either that such defence is a recent construction, to suit the prosecution case, or
that the defence is simply untrue and/or that the suspect is guilty.
Under Irish law, the defence must provide the prosecution with advance notice of
any alibi on which they will seek to rely at trial.88 Failure to do so will preclude the
defence from introducing such evidence at trial, unless the trial judge gives leave. This
generally plays out as part of the administrative preparation for trial, rather than as
part of the police (garda) interviewing of a suspect. However, failure to mention an
alibi defence which is later relied on at trial would also be covered by the terms of the
broadest Irish inference-drawing provision, s 19A, as would any other failure to mention
a fact relied on at trial which ‘clearly called for an explanation’ at the point of garda
questioning.
In the Netherlands, there is no statutory rule obligating suspects to give notice of
alibi or other defences; however, Dutch commentators note that when a suspect invokes
a defence ground such as a justification or excuse, in practice, this implies that the
suspect must provide details of the defence from the first interrogation. If, instead,
the suspect invokes the right to silence, this is likely to make their defence in court
unsuccessful.89 Furthermore, when the suspect invokes the right to silence, the court
will be more reluctant to accept a so-called Meer en Vaart defence.90 This is a defence
in which it is argued that the facts and circumstances used for a conviction also fit
within an alternative (not highly improbable) scenario in which the suspect cannot be
blamed for the offence.91 Clearly, invoking the right to silence at the early stages of the
investigation undermines the credibility of a Meer en Vaart defence when it is presented
at a later stage. Thus, in one case, the suspect’s explanation that he was sleeping in the
back of the car when the burglary was being committed, presented for the first time at
the hearing, was considered to be ‘unbelievable’, and the conviction was upheld by the
Dutch Supreme Court’.92
In addition, an alternative scenario may not be considered credible by the court
if the suspect invokes his right to silence and refuses to answer any more questions
88 Criminal Justice Act 1984, section 20.
89 Jörg, ‘Artikel 29 Sv- Aantekening 17.2’ in Melai and Groenhuijsen (eds), Tekst en Commentaar- Wetboek van
Strafvordering (2016).
90 The term ‘Meer en Vaart defence’ originates from the so-called ‘Meer en Vaart-judgment’ of the Supreme
Court. 1 February 1972, ECLI:NL:HR:1972:AB3369. This case involved a traffic accident, where the sus-
pect, accused of causing the collision, provided an alternative (innocent) explanation, which was plausible
given the existing evidence.
91 Supreme Court, 1 February 1972, NJ 1974/450.
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after having invoked this defence,93 or where they remain silent with regard to crucial
elements of their own narrative.94
In Italy, the adversarial principle and the presumption of innocence allow that where
the defence wishes to provide exculpatory evidence, it may do so after the prosecution
case has been presented. As a consequence, the suspect can, in principle, provide their
own explanation of the facts, for the first time, after the prosecution has disclosed the
probative elements on which it seeks to rely at trial.95 While the Italian system has
accepted (as outlined below) that a suspect’s pre-trial silence in relation to potentially
exculpatory facts may be considered a relevant matter in the overall context of proceed-
ings, it is not altogether clear, at least considering the case law of the Court of Cassation,
if a suspect’s initial silence can be relied upon to undermine the later revelation of a
defence.
7. OTHER EVIDENTIAL PURPOSES
Beyond their use a means to undermine a defence raised for the first time at trial,
it is somewhat difficult to unpick the case law across the three jurisdictions so as to
be fully clear on the other evidential purposes of inferences from silence. At times,
courts seem to use inferences as corroborating or supporting evidence, sometimes to
assist the interpretation of other evidence, and, on other occasions, as validation of the
prosecution case in the absence of a counter-narrative from the defence.
Under Irish legislation, the exact nature of the inferences which can be drawn has
not been clarified. However, safeguards attaching to the operation of the provisions state
that while an inference from pre-trial silence may act as corroboration (i.e. independent,
supporting evidence), it cannot be the sole or main basis for a conviction. ‘Corrobo-
ration’ has a specific meaning at common law,96 but the Irish courts have not required
strict adherence to the traditional rules around ‘corroboration’ in the context of drawing
inferences from silence. Rather, the courts have held that inferences are
deemed by statute to be capable of amounting to corroboration, so that in such
cases where corroboration is required as a matter of law or practice, it is capable
of being supplied by inferences being drawn pursuant to the relevant statutory
provisions.97
93 Supreme Court, 19 March 1996, ECLI:NL:HR:1996:ZD0413. However, the court must provide reasons
as to why it does not consider an alternative scenario put forward by the suspect credible, unless the scenario
is highly improbable. Supreme Court 16 March 2010, ECLI:NL:HR:2010:BK3359.
94 Likewise, if suspects keep changing their explanations, these explanations might be considered not credible
as an attempt to align the statement with the existing evidence. Lettinga, ‘Recht Doen aan de Alternatieve
s-Scenario’s’ (2015) 94(1) PROCES 50 at 57–8.
95 See also Carboni, ‘La valutazione probatoria del silenzio: critiche e prospettive’ (2018) 5 Processo Penale
e Giustizia, www.processopenaleegiustizia.it/valutazione-probatoria-del-silenzio-critiche-e-prospettive
[last accessed 18 January 2021].
96 In general terms, corroboration refers to an independent, credible item of evidence which tends to implicate
the suspect in the crime. See the foundational case of R v Baskerville [1916] KB 658. See further People
(DPP) v Power [2020] IESC 13.
97 DPP v Donnelly [2012] IECCA 78 at para 38, per O’Donnell J. See also McGillicuddy ‘Restrictions on the
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In essence, this seems to simply allow for an inference from a suspect’s silence during
garda interview to be counted as additional evidence for the prosecution. Certainly,
there are thresholds of varying natures to be satisfied and safeguards to be fulfilled under
the legislation, but, essentially, the trier of fact is invited to view the silence as an item
of evidence in and of itself, which gives additional weight to the prosecution. To give an
example, in line with the relevant legislation, if a suspect is found to have a blood stain
on their jacket in the context of an assault charge, the evidence of the blood stain, and
any forensic analysis thereof, will be evidence in the case, as will the suspect’s failure
or refusal to give an explanation for the presence of the blood on the jacket. There are
varying views as to whether or not it is fair to attach consequences for such a failure to
account. Some would say that the evidence is strong, and therefore, the request for an
account is reasonable and it would be expected that an innocent explanation could be
provided, if one existed. Others would point to the presumption of innocence and the
burden of proof and insist that the suspect should be under no compulsion to provide
a defence.
Dutch courts are careful to stress that silence cannot be used to fill in gaps in a
weak prosecution case, but it can strengthen the judge’s conviction of the suspect’s
guilt.98 However, they also allow other, more indirect, uses of inferences from silence—
or rather, the absence of a credible and verifiable exculpatory explanation from the
suspect—for evidential purposes in certain circumstances. In cases involving alleged
‘co-perpetration’, for example, the Dutch courts have allowed a suspect’s silence, or
failure to account, to effectively be used as indirect proof, where the prosecution case
lacks concrete evidence of the suspect’s role or other elements of the offence.
To prove ‘co-perpetration’ under Dutch law, it must be shown that the suspect
engaged in a conscious, complete and close collaboration with others and made a
sufficiently significant contribution to the principal offence.99 However, sometimes,
co-perpetration can be presumed, even if the prosecution does not supply concrete
information about the suspect’s role in the offence, provided that there is some evidence
of their involvement. This construction is typically used in burglaries, where several
people are found in the same car under suspicious circumstances close to the time
and place of the offence, and where traces of the offence are found in the car. In such
situations, all those found in the car are presumed to be co-perpetrators—which is
considered the most logical explanation—unless they provide a ‘believable’ explanation
as to why they only had a subordinate role, or were not involved in the offence at all.100
Whether or not the suspect has given this explanation can be decisive in determining
whether co-perpetration or the lesser participatory level of complicity is accepted as
proven by the court.101 This is based on the premise that it is impossible for the
authorities to establish exactly what the division of roles was without input from the
at 115; People (DPP) v Binead and Donohue [2007] 1 IR 374; People (DPP) v Matthews [2007] 2 IR 169;
People (DPP) v Birney and others [2007] 1 IR 337.
98 See e.g. Appellate Court of Arnhem 18 September 2012, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BX8202. See
also the conclusion of Advocate-General Hofstee in the case of Supreme Court, 5 July 2012,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2012:BW7372.
99 See also: Supreme Court, 2 December 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:3474, NJ 2015/390.
100 Meijer and ter Haar supra n 19 at 56.
101 This was determined in the so-called ‘July decisions’, see Supreme Court, 5 July 2016:
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(co-)suspects. Invoking the right to silence in such situations would almost inevitably
result in a conviction for co-perpetration.102
In an illustrative case, involving a burglary of a dental surgery, a suspect was found to
be a co-perpetrator due to his presence in a car (together with three other persons),
which was stopped by police near the place where the burglary was committed and
the occupants attempted to flee. A laptop from the burglary was found in the car. The
suspect was convicted as a co-perpetrator, although there was no direct evidence of his
contribution nor of the fact that the burglary was committed by several persons.103 This
kind of evidential construction offers a solution in cases where the concrete circum-
stances cannot be determined by the judge himself, but the most logical explanation
is that the suspect was criminally involved in the offence. If the suspect fails to fill that
gap and provide an explanation, the judge may rely on their prima facie judgment and
consider co-perpetration to be proven.104 In these, and other similar cases, a suspect’s
failure to provide a credible account is routinely mentioned in the evidentiary part of the
judgment. The silence of the suspect, or the failure to provide a contradictory narrative,
is taken as indirect proof of a more aggravated form of criminal participation.
The Dutch courts have also utilised a suspect’s reliance on their right to remain silent
as indirect proof in cases involving alleged money laundering or trading in stolen goods,
where suspects were found in possession of goods or money of illegal or ‘suspicious’
origin. In such circumstances, a suspect may be presumed to be engaged in intentional
trading of stolen goods or money laundering.105 The only way to avoid conviction
is to provide a credible explanation (which should not be too general)106 to refute
this presumption, and any silence or failure to give such an explanation is specifically
mentioned in the court’s evidentiary reasoning. Interestingly, the ECtHR has ruled (in
1318, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1319, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1321, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1322 and ECLI:NL:HR:
2016:1323.
102 Supreme Court, 18 February 2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:347 at paras 3.1–3.3.2.
103 Supreme Court, 28 November 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:3022.
104 See for instance, the District Court of Limburg case where the suspect was convicted for co-perpetration
of running a drugs lab. According to the court, the suspect should have given an explanation as to how his
DNA could be found on gloves, lighter and a cigarette at the crime scene, and since he failed to do so, the
court found co-perpetration proven, see District Court Limburg, 19 June 2018, case no 03/866021-16.
105 Supreme Court, 15 June 2004, ECLI:NL:HR:2004:AO963; Supreme Court, 14 June 2016,
ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1197; Supreme Court 8 September 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:2476; Supreme
Court, 5 July 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1315; Supreme Court, 29 January 2019, NJ 2019/310 met
annotatie van N. Rozemond. See also the conclusion of Advocate-General Hartelveld in the case of
Supreme Court, 11 July 2017, ECLI:NL:PHR:2017:635. Certain evidential presumptions are also
allowable in relation to the offence of money laundering in Ireland, which requires that an individual knew
or believed or was reckless as to whether or not relevant property was the proceeds of criminal conduct.
In a money laundering trial, it can be presumed that the suspect had the required state of mind, where
they engaged in certain conduct in relation to relevant property in circumstances where it is reasonable
to conclude that they knew, believed or were reckless about the fact that the property was the proceeds
of crime. The relevant conduct includes (a) concealing or disguising the true nature, source, location,
disposition, movement or ownership of property, or any rights relating to property; (b) converting,
transferring, handling, acquiring, possessing or using property and (c) removing property from, or
bringing property into, the State or a place outside the State. See Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and
Terrorist Financing) Act 2010, ss 7 and 11. Walsh has observed that the Irish legislature is increasingly
resorting to provisions which shift legal or evidential burdens ‘to overcome difficulties of proof’; Walsh,
supra n 51 at para 22–09.
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an inadmissibility decision and without providing detailed reasoning) that the use of
such evidentiary constructions in money laundering cases does not amount to shifting
the burden of proof on to the suspect or a breach of the presumption of innocence,
and it does not interfere with the right to silence, as long as there is a ‘convincing body
of circumstantial evidence’ implicating the suspect, as the inferences from failure to
provide an explanation are only used to ‘corroborate’ this evidence.107
The outlined line of judicial reasoning in the Dutch courts, whereby certain pre-
sumptions of fact are made and evidentiary weight is attached to the absence of an
exculpatory explanation, emerged around 2015, and the body of such case law is steadily
growing.108 The reasoning has been criticised.109 Of particular, relevance is that in these
situations, inferences from silence are used not simply to strengthen an already strong
prosecution case, but, as it seems, to fill in gaps in the court’s reasoning, or the body
of proof.110 In the absence of a credible explanation from the suspect, the nature of
certain crucial elements of the offence is presumed without requiring the prosecution
to attach concrete proof. Arguably, here inferences from silence play a role similar to
private litigation, namely to serve as indirect proof of allegations made by a party, where
it is difficult for that party to prove them, because the relevant evidence is (deemed to
be) controlled by the other party. An inference thus effectively penalises the party in
control of the evidence for the failure to produce it. It is questionable, however, whether
this use of inferences from the suspect’s silence in criminal proceedings is compatible
with underlying principles, namely the requirement that the burden of proof of all
elements of the offence must be on the prosecution, and the presumption of innocence.
In such situations, introducing a presumption of fact by statute would arguably be a
more transparent solution.
While Italian law prohibits the use of silence as direct evidence to prove guilt, as
in Ireland and the Netherlands, the use of such silence for other evidential purposes
is widespread within the case law. Over the years, the different sections of the Court
of Cassation have variously described the phenomenon. In a 1996 case, the Court of
Cassation stated that a guilty verdict can legitimately be based on the appreciation of
evidence with reference to which silence operates as a form of ‘objective corrobora-
tion’.111 The meaning of the term ‘objective corroboration’ is unclear. No definition or
explanation is provided, either in the case law or in the Code.112 Some scholarship has
underlined its ‘enigmatic’ meaning.113 It remains unclear whether silence in such cases
107 Zschüschen v Belgium Application No 23572/07), Admissibility, 2 May 2017.
108 Meijer and ter Haar, supra n 19 at 56.
109 Crijns and Dubelaar, ‘Erosion of the Right to Silence in Dutch Criminal Justice?’ in Eidam, Lindemann and
Ransiek (eds), Interrogations, Confessions and Truth (2020) 123 at 139–147.
110 See, e.g. conclusion of Advocate-General Hofstee (not followed) in case of 5 July 2016
ECLI:NL:HR:2016:1315 detailing which elements courts must justify, with evidence, to prove
co-perpetration, and demonstrating that crucial elements of proof were missing in this and other
similar cases upheld by the Supreme Court. See likewise, conclusions of Advocate-General Spronken
(not followed) in cases of 8 September 2015, ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:1365 and of 29 January 2019,
ECLI:NL:PHR:2018:1234.
111 Court of Cassation, Section VI, 9 February 1996, Federici ed altro.
112 The Code uses the term ‘corroboration’ only to refer to those elements that confirm the reliability of what
the declarant has affirmed in case of complicity; this meaning is not applicable to this context. See Ubertis,
Profili di Epistemologia Giudiziaria (2015) at 170.
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is to be taken as increasing the probative weight of other evidence or whether, instead,
it could corroborate other evidence which has the potential in itself to lead the court to
consider the suspect guilty ‘beyond any reasonable doubt’.
More recently, the Court has abandoned this vague wording and adopted a clearer
stance on the issue. The silence of the suspect at the pre-trial stage has been considered
an ‘argomento di prova’—a means to interpret other, otherwise collected, evidence.114
As clarified by the Court of Cassation in a 2015 case, silence may be taken into account
in a residual and complementary manner, and respecting the threshold requirement
(together with probative accusatory elements which have an unequivocal meaning).115
The Court also underlined that the burden of proof cannot be reversed.116 In such
cases, silence is not given an autonomous probative meaning, and some safeguards are
provided for. Hence, the Court of Cassation seems to allow the drawing of a rather ‘light’
adverse inference from silence in these cases (as a residual and complementary tool to
interpret other evidence).
Recent Italian case law has addressed the situation where a suspect refuses to provide
exculpatory explanations or remains silent throughout the proceedings in relation to
potentially inculpatory circumstances. In one such case, the judge of first instance had
reconstructed the facts of an offence of aiding a dangerous individual to escape justice
on the basis of the available evidence.117 The suspects had been seen entering an empty
building—where the person was later found—with a voluminous plastic bag, allegedly
containing supplies for the individual at large, turning off their phones before entering
the building and afterwards switching them on when out.118 The Court stated that it
was not possible to reconstruct the facts in a way that would exculpate the suspects,
because the latter did not clarify the reasons behind the described behaviour, missing
an opportunity to exculpate themselves.119
The Court of Cassation upheld the judgment—it considered it possible to assess
silence, but always together with any other relevant element.120 The Court of Cas-
sation argued that although silence should initially be considered a ‘neutral’ element
within proceedings, it can acquire a more significant relevance, in the context of other
accusatory elements in the case.121 Hence, where the evidence points to the responsi-
bility of the suspect, their failure throughout the proceedings to offer an explanation
of the events would represent an implicit validation of the existing evidence. Another
judgment also specifies that, in cases of this nature, a judge is not obliged to verify
hypotheses that are alternative to the one advanced by the prosecution.122 The weight
of the inference is thus rather heavy and seems to carry a sort of punitive meaning.
114 Court of Cassation, Section II, Decision No 6348 of 28 February 2015, Drago; Court of Cassation, Section
III, Decision No 43254 of 19 September 2019, C.
115 Court of Cassation, Section II, Decision No 6348 of 28 February 2015, Drago.
116 Ibid.
117 Arena supra n 86.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
120 E.g. Di Perna supra n 74; Sez. 5, Court of Cassation, Section V, Decision No 12182 of 14 February 2006,
Ferrara.
121 Berlusconi supra n 86.
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Suspects are almost expected to provide counter-evidence, as challenging the evidence
presented by the prosecution seems to be more of an obligation than a right.
Our comparative analysis demonstrates differences in how the examined jurisdic-
tions approach the evidential value of adverse inferences from silence. In certain cir-
cumstances, Italian courts consider inferences to be of little value, arguing that they are
only used to interpret other incriminating evidence, which is already strong. However,
the weight of inferences seems to be more substantial when the suspect fails to provide
exculpatory explanations in the face of potentially inculpatory evidence. Dutch courts
appear to attach relatively significant value to inferences, expressly stating that an
inference may ‘tip the scales’ in favour of a conviction, where the available evidence is
insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden for a conviction. In Ireland, it is impossible to
tell what weight juries give to inferences, but it is quite possible that an inference could
play a significant role in the totality of the evidence in a given case, as the applicable
standard is simply that an inference should not to be the sole or main grounds for a
conviction. In the three-judge Special Criminal Court, an exceptional court in the Irish
context which presides over cases of an related to paramilitary or organised crime, there
have certainly been cases where inferences were relied on within the totality of the
evidence in arriving at the ultimate outcome.123 In general, however, it would appear
that the actual value of inferences as an item of proof (at the trial stage) is significantly
low, as compared with items of real evidence.124 If the prosecution has a strong case
against a suspect, an inference from silence is not likely to have decisive impact on the
determination of guilt. If the prosecution case falls short of the standard of proof —
beyond reasonable doubt or a ‘formidable case’—should the fact that the suspect has
said nothing tip the scales enough to reliably find against them?
8. PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
The Irish statutory inference-drawing provisions come with a list of safeguards which
reflect both Irish constitutional and ECtHR jurisprudence on the right to silence:
• An inference drawn at trial may not be the sole or main basis for a conviction, but
it may serve as corroboration of any evidence in relation to which the failure is
material;
• The suspect must be told in ordinary language that it may harm the credibility of
their defence if they do not mention—when questioned, charged or informed that
they may be prosecuted—something which they later rely on in court;
123 See, for example DPP v Cumberton, Special Criminal Court, 29 January 2018. Notably, judges of the Diplock
courts in Northern Ireland were found to more commonly draw inferences to ‘copper-fasten’ a strong case
than to bring a case up to the required standard of proof: see Jackson, Wolfe and Quinn, Legislating Against
Silence: The Northern Ireland Experience (2000).
124 At the investigative stage, as suggested particularly in research from England and Wales, the (risk of the) use
of inferences might act as a factor persuading suspects to provide an early explanation (including through
the intermediary of legal advice) and therefore waive their right to silence. See, e.g. Quirk supra n 24;
Pivaty, Criminal Defence at Police Stations: A Comparative and Empirical Study (2019) at 125–30. However,
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• The suspect must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult a solicitor prior
to the relevant silence;125
• The court or jury in deciding whether or not to draw inferences ought to consider
when the account or fact concerned was first mentioned by the suspect;
• No inference shall be drawn in relation to a question asked in an interview unless
either the interview was electronically recorded or the detained person consented
otherwise in writing.
In order to facilitate the proper administration of these safeguards, current garda
practice in Ireland is that separate and specific interviews are held during which the
inference provisions are explained and particular, relevant questions are put to the
suspect.126 A suspect will often have been interviewed twice or three times before
an inference interview is held. Generally, only a failure or refusal to answer questions
during that specific interview will be used to ground an inference at trial.
The express provision of the above-outlined safeguards is one benefit of an overt,
legislative approach to the drawing of inferences from silence in the criminal process.
In Italy and the Netherlands, where the emergence of inferences from silence has
occurred piecemeal through the judgments of the courts, the limitations and safeguards
concerning inferences specifically are less clearly spelled out.
Having said that the Italian system does provide relatively strong protections for the
right of access to a lawyer, which has always been tied by the ECtHR to the protection
of the right to silence.127 Italian law requires that prior to any questioning of a suspect,
the relevant interrogating authority (either the police, the prosecutor or the judge)
must verify that they have nominated a defence lawyer (if this is not the case, a public
defender is appointed); the suspect’s lawyer has the right to be present during the
questioning and, in some cases, such presence is compulsory (for example, when the
police takes the initiative to question the suspect).128 Furthermore, any questioning
must be documented through minutes129 and must be audio-visually or audio recorded
when the suspect is in detention and is questioned out of hearing.130 In all other cases,
the questioning can be audio-visually recorded when absolutely necessary.131
In the Netherlands, although the right of early access to a lawyer has been recently
strengthened,132 courts do not seem to consider formal procedural guarantees as
125 On the right of access to legal advice in Ireland, see Conway and Daly, ‘From Legal Advice to Legal
Assistance: Recognising the Changing Role of the Solicitor in the Garda Station’ (2019) Irish Judicial Studies
Journal 103.
126 See Garda Code of Practice on Access to a Solicitor by Persons in Garda Custody, Section 7, available
at: www.garda.ie/en/About-Us/Publications/Policy-Documents/Code-of-Practice-on-Access-to-a-Soli
citor-by-Persons-in-Garda-Custody.pdf [last accessed 31 October 2020].
127 John Murray, supra n 9; Beckles v United Kingdom Application No 44652/98, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 8
October 2002; Condron, supra n 14; Salduz v Turkey Application No 36391/02, Merits and Just Satisfaction,
27 November 2008.
128 CCP, Article 350(3).
129 CCP, Article 134.
130 CCP, Article 141 bis(1).
131 CCP, Article 134(4).
132 Namely, it was extended to the periods before and during first interrogations of the suspect by police. See,
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separate and independent safeguards when drawing inferences from suspects’ full or
partial silence. This is mostly due to the fact that the (possibility of) drawing of adverse
inferences is not considered independently by Dutch courts, but it is only one factor
in the (often complex) decision on suspect’s guilt, based on the ‘holistic’ assessment of
the evidence. (Common law judges, in contrast, consider the issue of adverse inferences
separately, as they must decide whether or not, and in with what warning, if any, it
should be put to the jury.) The procedural circumstances in which statements were
(or were not) given at the investigative stage are considered only insofar as they are
deemed relevant to assessing the ‘sincerity’ of suspect’s explanations given at later stages.
For instance, a Dutch court might accept the argument that the suspect failed to tell
the ‘whole story’ to the police because they were subjected to unlawful interrogative
pressure.133 Oher procedural circumstances of suspects’ interrogations, such as whether
or not they had adequate access to legal assistance, or were informed about the accusa-
tion or evidence against them (among others), are unlikely to be considered relevant.
Thus, Dutch courts do not appear to subject pre-trial silence to greater scrutiny or more
stringent requirements for drawing adverse inferences, than silence at trial.134 Dutch
courts also seem suspicious of the suspect’s reasons for remaining silent. For example,
in a 2018 Supreme Court case, the suspect’s desire not to implicate their sister and co-
suspect was not considered valid to justify silence, because protecting a family member
was not their only motive: the silence was also self-serving.135 Invoking fear of reprisals,
likewise, is unlikely to be considered a valid reason.136 All in all, the Dutch approach to
adverse inferences from suspect’s silence reveals, on the one hand, great confidence in
the ability of judges and prosecutors to establish material ‘truth’, and on the other hand,
a great deal of mistrust of suspects who choose to remain silent. This appears consistent
with the prevailing inquisitorial tradition.
Under the Irish legislative safeguards, a suspect must be told, in ordinary language,
that a failure to provide certain information in the garda station can be later drawn to
the attention of the jury (or Special Criminal Court). Accordingly, such person is in a
position to consciously consider their options. By comparison, the 1997 Dutch case of
Strippenkaart suggested that no warning of the potential adverse consequences needs to
be given during police questioning, as the suspect should know as a matter of common
sense that a failure to provide exculpatory evidence might have negative consequences
at trial. In Italy, the law requires the questioning authority to caution the suspect, before
the start of the questionings, of their right not to answer any question, although the
proceedings will continue anyway.137 The suspect needs also to be cautioned of their
133 In a similar way, the circumstances of interrogation may be considered relevant to assess the credibility of
a confession. See van Toor and Lestrade, ‘De Beoordeling van Betrouwbaarheidsverweren bij Ingetrokken
Bekennende Verklaringen’ (2020) 11 Delikt en Delinkwent 132 at 162.
134 See, in contrast, Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report (1981) at para 4.64: ‘The issues which
arise in relation to silence at the court stage are different from those in connection with silence in the face
of police questioning. The accused person is by then aware of the case against him; the prosecution will
have had to make out a prima facie case against the accused; he will have had an opportunity to consider his
defence and usually to consult a lawyer; the proceedings are open to public scrutiny and it is unlikely that
anyone can take advantage of an accused who is unaware of his rights’.
135 Supreme Court 25 September 2018, NJ 2018/437 met annotatie van W.H. Vellinga.
136 Court of East Brabant 5 October 2018, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2018:4922.
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right to silence in writing by the police while executing a pre-trial detention order138
and when they arrest the suspect in the act of committing certain crimes (‘arresto’) or
stop them in execution of a prosecutorial order (‘fermo’).139 The Code does not detail
the consequences of exercising the right to silence. This has been identified as one of
the sore points of the regulations concerning the right to silence.
While we have discussed, above, the threshold requirements for reliance on infer-
ences from silence in coming to the ultimate conclusion in a criminal trial, the threshold
requirement for a suspect response during police interrogation is less clear. At what
point can it be said that a suspect ought to respond, in the pre-trial process, to the
evidence which has been gathered at that stage? A detained suspect, and indeed per-
haps even an experienced lawyer, might struggle to foresee how a prosecution might
ultimately be constructed and how a subsequent trial might ultimately play out. Indeed,
the issue at to what facts objectively call for revelation or explanation during the pre-trial
stage of investigation is surely linked to the disclosure provided at the relevant time. If a
suspect has not been confronted with all of the evidence in existence against them, are
they to be expected to provide all sorts of facts to the police so as to avoid a potential
future inference being drawn? This would likely be contrary to the presumption of
innocence and would involve a significant shift in the burden of proof. Jackson has
suggested that a threshold of evidence ought to be reached before a suspect in police
detention should be invited to respond.140 In Ireland, there has not as yet been a case
which looked closely at the issue of disclosure prior to interview in the garda station and
there is no legislation directly on this point.141
In the Netherlands, as explained above, pre-interview disclosure is not considered a
relevant factor when deciding to draw an adverse inference from silence at the investiga-
tive stage. According to the established practice, suspects and their lawyers obtain access
to the case file once the case is referred to court (for suspects at liberty), or shortly before
first pre-trial detention hearing before the judge, if detention is envisaged. No disclosure
is usually provided before initial police interrogations.142 On the contrary, failure to
provide sufficient details to police (for example, concerning suspects’ whereabouts or
actions around the time of the offence); or changing these details at the later stages after
suspects obtain access to the case file may contribute to the finding that the suspect’s
exculpatory account is not credible.143 This is based on the premise that suspects who
138 CPP, Article 293(1)(d), as amended by the decreto legislativo No 101, 1 July 2014, which transposed the
Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to
information in criminal proceedings [2012] OJ L 142/01.
139 CPP, Article 386(1)(d) and (1 bis).
140 Jackson, ‘Re-Conceptualizing the Right to Silence as an Effective Fair Trial Standard’ (2009) 58 Interna-
tional and Comparative Law Quarterly 835 at853–854.
141 The Garda Code of Practice on Access to a Solicitor by Persons in Garda Custody does set out some
procedural guidelines in relation to disclosure in advance of an adverse inference interview. See supra n
126 at section 7.3.
142 For a description of this practice, see Pivaty supra n 124 at 50–52.
143 See e.g. Appellate Court of the Hague, 23 July 2019, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2019:1974; District Court of East
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speak later or change their statements aim to ‘adjust’ their version to the ‘official’ account
of the events.144
In Italy, full disclosure is not provided at the initial point of pre-trial questioning.
After the administration of the necessary caution, the questioning authority notifies the
suspect—in a clear and precise manner—of the provisional charges, the evidentiary
elements against them and, where this does not undermine the investigation, the
sources of evidence.145 Even this ‘partial’ disclosure, however, is not required when the
police take the autonomous decision to interview the suspect (‘assunzione di sommarie
informazioni’, meaning ‘collection of brief statements’).146 Later on, at the end of the
pre-trial investigation, a suspect can make a request to be questioned by the prosecutor,
and the prosecutor is obliged to invite the suspect to an interrogation.147 In this case, the
suspect and the defence lawyer have—for the first time—access to all the documents
concerning the activities carried out by the prosecutor during the investigation.
9. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
International human rights are ‘practical and effective’148 when they operate according
to their nature and purpose in domestic legal contexts. The above examination of the
practical application of adverse inference provisions and the right to silence in criminal
proceedings in Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy has led to a number of interesting
revelations. First, while two of the examined jurisdictions (Netherlands and Italy)
prohibit the use of adverse inferences from silence in criminal proceedings as a general
rule, all three jurisdictions have introduced evidential consequences for suspects who
remain fully or partially silent. In Ireland, such consequences have been introduced
by way of legislation, whereas their emergence in the Netherlands and Italy has been
through the decisions of the courts. One observation which might be made from this
is that even in jurisdictions which appear not to have inference-drawing provisions,
inferences from silence might yet be a matter of practice. It is likely, drawing particularly
from the Irish and English experience, that their use will grow rather than decrease
in the future. Particularly in civil law jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, adverse
inferences might increasingly surface in court decisions due to erosion of the free proof
principle.149
Given that the momentum, both on the European level and domestically, is towards
tolerating adverse inferences from silence rather than entirely banning them, we argue
that appropriate limits, in the form of safeguards, should be placed on their use. This
follows in particular from the requirement of transparency and foreseeability of law,
including clarity on the limitations imposed by the legal system on individual rights.
A central safeguard with regard to drawing adverse inferences according to both
ECtHR case law and domestic laws is the so-called evidentiary threshold. Our anal-
144 This reasoning is regularly invoked in case law when discussing credibility of suspects’ statements. For
numerous examples, see Lettinga supra n 94. See also van Toor and Lestrade supra n 133 at 155.
145 CCP, Article 65(1). If this notification is omitted or insufficient, the ‘interrogatorio’ is invalid (Article
178(1)(c)).
146 CCP, Article 350(1)–(4).
147 CCP, Article 415 bis.
148 Artico v Italy Application no 6694/74, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 13 May 1980 at para 33.
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ysis, however, reveals that it might be challenging to compose one legally meaningful
definition of this threshold, which would resonate across all European jurisdictions.
In each of the examined jurisdictions the decision as to whether or not the required
threshold has been met to allowing the drawing of an inference from the suspect’s
silence requires an often nuanced case-by-case analysis. To define the ‘tipping point’,
courts use formulations like ‘a circumstance, which (clearly) calls for an explanation’,
‘the existence of a prima facie case’ or ‘no other reasonable explanation (than the
one unfavourable to the suspect) is possible’. All these definitions reflect an idea that
inferences should not be used to camouflage shortcomings or gaps in the prosecution
evidence. On the European level, it might be suitable to provide general guidelines to
this effect, along with procedural requirements of how the evidentiary threshold should
be assessed.
Another potential safeguard around the use of adverse inferences is defining the
purpose(s) for which inferences from silence can be used. The purposes for which the
inferences are used is not discussed in any detail in the respective ECtHR case law or the
EU Directive on the Presumption of Innocence. Our comparative analysis shows that
inferences from silence, as they operate in practice, have differing evidential purposes,
which are particularly difficult to discern. Across all three jurisdictions, we looked at the
use of inferences to undermine the credibility of a defence, to interpret other evidence,
as corroboration, and/or to be used as validation of the prosecution case. Often these
purposes are not expressly stated in the law or case law, but they must be inferred from
the courts’ reasoning. Sometimes, there are inherent contradictions. In the Netherlands,
for instance, although there is a general rule that silence ought not to be used to fill gaps
in the evidence presented by the prosecution, in the context of co-perpetration, money
laundering and aggravated trading of stolen goods cases at least, it seems that inferences
from silence are being used to such effect. We therefore call for more reflection with
regard to the legitimate purpose(s) of inferences from silence both on the European
level and domestically, along with a requirement of transparency in respect of these
purpose(s).
Thirdly, particular attention should be paid, on European and domestic levels, to
procedural safeguards around the use of adverse inferences in criminal proceedings.
These safeguards should stretch further than the assessment of whether the suspect
invoked the right to remain silent due to unlawful interrogative pressure. These include,
as a minimum, informing suspects about the (possible) downstream consequences
of silence, sufficient disclosure of evidence before calling the suspect to account, and
ensuring access to effective legal assistance.
An inference from silence ought not to be drawn where no evidence, or none of
significant probative value, had been put to the suspect at that point.150 Furthermore,
effective legal advice for detained suspects, so that they can make fully informed
decisions on their approach to questioning, in light of any adverse consequences which
might later flow therefrom, should be considered as another associated safeguard.
Coupled with this, we think it important that if inferences are becoming the norm in
a jurisdiction, explicit warnings of that fact ought to be given to suspects at the relevant
150 See also Jackson, ‘Responses to Salduz: Procedural Tradition, Change and the Need for Effective Defence’
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time. It cannot be presumed that an individual knows that adverse consequences might
follow from their silence, especially where there is no overt legislative basis for that in
their jurisdiction. Indeed, the notion of a right to remain silent is so prevalent in popular
culture, tv and movies that the public presumption might well be to the opposite effect.
Having said that it is important that such information is not provided in a threatening
manner so as to elicit a response, which would undermine the voluntariness of any
statement made thereafter. Procedural safeguards against inappropriate use of adverse
inferences from suspect’s silence are not merely ‘formal’ requirements, which distract
fact-finders from establishing the ‘truth’. They are meant to ensure that persons in con-
tact with the justice system, and the public in general, have confidence that exercising
their right to silence would not be unduly penalised or lead to unfair treatment.
Finally, in considering the effects of inferences from silence in the criminal process, it
is important to pay attention to the procedural and institutional context of that process.
As our analysis suggests, certain rules and practices, which are not immediately relevant
or specific to the right to silence, might have a great practical effect on the operation of
adverse inferences. These are, for instance, those related to the assessment of evidence,
burden of proof, or the relationship between pre-trial and trial stages of the proceedings.
One important example is the laws and practices related to whether and under which
conditions the triers of fact (judges or juries) can obtain access to the suspect’s pre-
trial statements, including the information about whether or not the suspect remained
silent, or partially silent. For instance, in the Netherlands, the right to silence might be
more effectively protected by limiting the judges’ access to this information, than by
the existing ban on the use of silence as ‘direct evidence of guilt’. It is also of relevance
whether inferences are drawn by (professional) judges as part of the holistic assessment
of evidence as in civil law countries or whether they are treated as a separate procedural
issue, to which a distinct set of safeguards and rules applies (for instance, because a judge
must make them explicit to a jury), as in common law countries. In the latter scenario,
there is a greater chance that due attention would be paid to the procedural safeguards
against inappropriate use of inferences.
The research presented in this article shows the value of cross-jurisdictional, con-
textual study, especially in a European context. All three jurisdictions are subject to the
ECHR and are EU member states. While Ireland has not opted in to all of the same EU
Directives on procedural rights of suspects as Italy and the Netherlands (e.g. Ireland
has not opted into the Directive on Access to a Lawyer in Criminal Proceedings151 or
the Directive on the Presumption of Innocence152), its membership of the EU and its
new position as the largest common law jurisdiction therein, means that even when
it does not opt in to such measures, they have a soft influence on the Irish criminal
justice system. Notwithstanding the fact that all three systems have subscribed to and
been influenced by the European fair trial rights’ frameworks, we observed important
differences in their inference-drawing regimes, some of which may be attributed to
the nature of their legal procedural system (common law or civil law; inquisitorial or
adversarial). None of the three systems, however, de facto consider the right to silence
151 Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings [2013] OJ L294/1.
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as ‘absolute’. This ‘case study’ thus demonstrates the potential limits of harmonising
the right to remain silent on the European level. More specifically, we would argue
that instead of trying to achieve ‘stronger’ formulations of the scope of the right to
silence in the national laws of member states, further ‘harmonisation’ could be achieved
through encouraging member states to provide greater transparency and foreseeability
of the provisions on adverse inferences from silence, as well to introduce appropriate
safeguards for their use.
This could be achieved in a number of different ways.153 One possible option is the
case law of the ECtHR, wherein, while considering the overall fairness of proceedings
in appropriate Article 6 cases, attention could be paid to the procedural protections
afforded to suspects (e.g. their knowledge and understanding of any potential adverse
consequences of their pre-trial silence, the level of disclosure provided during the
interrogational stage of the criminal process, along with access to legal assistance);
the appropriate threshold in evidence at which an inference may be invoked; and the
proper purpose to which evidence of pre-trial silence may be put. However, relying
on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is a rather passive method of achieving progress
on this important procedural rights issue, which requires the right case to come along
in order to give rise to the necessary arguments. The same applies to the alternative
avenue of litigation on the issues before the Court of Justice of the European Union.
An alternative, more assertive approach, would be for the European Commission to
issue (non-binding) recommendations or guidelines to member states, pursuant to
the Directive on the Presumption of Innocence, to clearly establish European-wide
minimum standards on the actual operation and use of inferences drawn from silence
and to require the clear implementation of procedural protections such as those out-
lined herein across member states. This ought not to be seen as an encouragement
to introduce inferences where none currently exist, but to clarify their operation and
related procedural protections where they do. Such an approach would shine a light
on the issues highlighted throughout this article and would actively further the overall
objective of the Procedural Roadmap Directives to establish minimum standards across
member states so as to facilitate mutual trust.
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